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1 Introduction  
Many European countries, including the largest ones, are characterized by high labor 
taxes and high unemployment rates (Nickell (2004)). Although the causal relationship 
between labor taxes and unemployment remains a much debated issue, there are strong 
social and political pressures favorable to payroll tax cuts. The aim of this paper is to 
evaluate the quantitative effects of various labor tax cut scenarios on employment, 
productivity and welfare. To that end, we develop a calibrated general equilibrium model 
with heterogeneous labor and search.  
The main implications of a labor tax cut in a standard aggregate model are well-
known. With an inelastic labor supply curve (or wage-setting curve in an imperfect 
competition setup), tax cuts lead to higher net wages and have little impact on 
employment. By definition, such aggregate models fail to take into account the 
heterogeneity observed on actual labor markets. Accounting for this heterogeneity may 
be crucial, especially if payroll tax cuts are targeted on specific groups of workers. We 
focus in this paper on skill heterogeneity. This choice is motivated by the fact that the 
unemployment rise has been especially strong for low-skill workers. Several mechanisms 
may have contributed to this outcome. One possible mechanism is the rigidity of relative 
wages resulting, for instance, from minimum wage regulations in the face of asymmetric 
productivity shocks (see Greenaway and Winchester (2007)) who emphasize the role of 
embodied technological change and capital-skill complementarities). Tax cuts targeted on 
low-skill workers may in this context be seen as a means to decrease their relative wage 
cost and stimulate low-skill employment without changing relative net wages. An 
alternative mechanism has also attracted attention. Low-skill unemployment can be the 
result of job competition between high-and low-skill workers in a depressed labor 
market. If high-skill job seekers react to a demand slack by searching on both the high-
and the low-skill segments of the labor market and by accepting jobs for which they are 
over-qualified, they will "crowd out" some low-skill workers. If wages are downwards 
rigid at the bottom of the skill ladder, this crowding-out effect will lead to more low-skill 
unemployment. Dolado et al. (2000) examine Spanish labor market and find symptoms of 
over-education. Similar conclusions are drawn for instance by Mavromaras et al. (2007) 
for Britain and Australia.  
To examine the implications of payroll tax cuts in such contexts, we set up a 
general equilibrium model including the government budget constraint and a 
representation of the labor market à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), with job 
competition effects as in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Blazquez and Jansen (2008), 
and on-the-job search as in Dolado et al. (2002) and Gautier (2002). We distinguish three 
types of jobs and three types of workers. We first neglect job competition effects and 
evaluate the implications of targeted and non-targeted tax cuts. We next re-examine the 
same tax cut scenarios when there is job competition and overeducated workers hold low-
skill jobs. The model is calibrated on Belgian data, but the comparisons across scenarios 
are valid for other countries sharing similar features in terms of low-skill unemployment 
and downward wage rigidities at the low end of the skill ladder. Our paper is closest to 
Pierrard (2005). This paper distinguishes only two types of jobs and workers but has an 
endogenous job destruction rate. It suggests, by comparison with previous general 
equilibrium models, that the effects of a tax cut targeted on minimum wages can be very 
large and come through the job destruction rather than the job creation channel1. This 
result is in line with the empirical results obtained for instance by Laroque and Salanié 
(2000), Crépon and Desplatz (2001, 2002) and Kramarz and Philippon (2001) on French 
data. The relative importance of the job destruction channel (as opposed to the job 
creation channel) may however be overemphasized in the Pierrard (2005) setup as, by 
construction, the direct impact of minimum wage changes is on the job destruction rate. 
In our paper, we reintroduce a direct link between job creation and minimum wages by 
distinguishing three categories of jobs and workers. The third and lowest-skill group is 
defined as workers on low-skill jobs, paid the minimum wage. With three skill categories, 
we can also refine the analysis of job competition effects. For computational reasons, we 
compensate these additional complexities by assuming an exogenous job destruction rate. 
We know of course from Pierrard (2005) to what extent the endogenizing of the 
destruction rate would reinforce our results. Agénor et al. (2007) also investigate the 
effects of payroll tax cuts targeted on low-skill workers, in the context of developing 
countries with internal and external migrations.  
Our main policy conclusions can be summarized as follows. Absent job competition 
effects, narrow targeting at minimum wages is crucial for the success of a tax cut policy: 
employment effects are large enough to render the measure self-financing and beneficial 
for all categories of workers. This confirms Pierrard’s results, despite the fact that we 
neglect the job destruction channel. Introducing job competition does not reverse the 
main conclusion: tax cuts targeted on minimum wage jobs have sizeable effects on low-
skill unemployment. The cost per job created is however severely increased, which 
sharply reduces the welfare gains for workers with higher skill levels. This suggest that, 
in the face of job competition and in order to reverse the ladder effect to some extent, one 
should prefer a scheme combining large tax rebates for low-skill jobs, substantially 
smaller rebates for medium-skill jobs and no tax rebate at all for high-skill jobs.  
2 The Model  
We consider four categories of agents: (i) final good firms, (ii) intermediate good firms, 
(iii) workers and (iv) the government (including social security). We further distinguish 
three types of intermediate firms, indexed j ∈ {1,2,3} according to the degree of 
sophistication of the technology in use and complexity of the tasks to be fulfilled by the 
workers. Similarly we distinguish three categories of workers, indexed by their skill level 
i ∈ {1,2,3}. The more sophisticated the technology, the higher the required skill level. 
Over-education and job competition/de-skilling effects are introduced by allowing 
workers to take jobs for which they are one skill level overqualified. We assume that the 
three skill categories constitute constant fractions αi of the total (constant) population.  
                                                 
1 Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) also emphasize the role of the job destruction channel, in a setup with 
linear production functions (rather than Cobb-Douglas), no minimum wage regulation and no job 
competition effects.  
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2.1 Labor market flows  
Workers of a given skill category i can be either unemployed or employed. If employed, 
they can have a job corresponding to their skill level (a “normal” job) or one for which 
they are overeducated (a “de-skilling” job): 
  Ui,t + Ni,t + Ñi,t = αi, (1)  
where the tilde indicates a deskilling job. All variables are normalized so that ∑i αi = 1. 
Unemployed workers allocate all their available time to search, either on their own job 
market (a fraction ei,t of their time) or (when relevant) on the job market for which they 
are overeducated (a fraction ẽi,t = 1 - ei,t of their time). Search intensities are increasing 
and concave functions of the fraction of time devoted to search: si,t = si(ei,t) and 
s ̃i,t = s ̃i(ẽi,t) respectively. Workers on de-skilling jobs can continue to search for jobs 
corresponding to their skill level. Their on-the-job search efficiency is an increasing and 
concave function of the fraction of their spare time devoted to search: soi(eoi,t). We keep 
in mind that workers at the bottom of the skill ladder (i=1) cannot be in a situation of de-
skilling (e1,t=1, eo1,t=0 and Ñ1,t=0).  Similarly, in the most skill-demanding segment (j=3), 
there are no overeducated workers. 
Let Mj,t denote new matches in sector j. We assume a constant-returns-to-scale 
matching function Mj,t = mj M(Vj,t, Ωj,t), where mj is an efficiency parameter, Vj is the 
number of vacancies and Ωj is the number of job seekers weighted by their respective 
search efficiencies. On a given job market j there can be at most three types of job 
seekers: workers with the adequate skill level j, either unemployed (Uj,t) or employed on 
a de-skilling job (Ñj,t), plus unemployed workers with excessive skill level (Uj+1,t). 
Adjusting for search efficiencies, we obtain: 
  Ωj,t = sj,t Uj,t + soj,t Ñj,t  + s̃j+1,t Uj+1,t  , j ∈ {1,2,3} (2)   
Defining the local market tightness as θj = Vj/Ωj, the probability for any eligible 
candidate to find a job in market j becomes pj,t = mj φ(θj,t), where φ is increasing in 
tightness. The probability to fill a vacancy in a given sector becomes qj,t = mj ψ(θj,t), 
where ψ is decreasing in tightness. Let ωj,t denote the fraction (in efficiency units) of job 
seekers with the right skill level i=j. The probability to hire a worker with adequate (resp. 
excessive) skill level is ωj,t qj,t (reps. (1 – ωj,t) qj,t). In the top segment, all applicants have 
the right qualification level.  
Assume that a fraction χj of existing jobs is destroyed each period. The number of 
workers employed on a job corresponding to their skill level evolves according to:  
  Nj,t+1 = (1–χj) Nj,t + ωj,t qj,t Vj,t, (3.a)  
 = (1–χj) Nj,t + ωj,t pj,t Ωj,t ,   for j ∈ {1,2,3}, (3.b)  
while the number of overeducated workers (those with an extra degree of skill, i=j+1) 
evolves according to:  
  Ñj+1,t+1 = (1–χj) Ñj+1,t + (1–ωj,t) qj,t Vj,t  , (4.a)   
 = (1–χj) Ñj+1,t + (1–ωj,t) pj,t Ωj,t  ,        for j ∈ {1,2,3}. (4.b)  
Total employment in sector j is equal to the sum (Nj,t + Ñj+1,t). In the specific case with 
perfect segmentation (no job competition/de-skilling effects, no on-the-job search), all 
workers would remain on their own market (ei,t=1 for all i’s). Firms would always hire 
workers with the most adequate skill level (ωj = 1 for all j’s).  
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2.2 Intermediate firms  
An intermediate firm in sector j is a one-worker entity with labor productivity yj, whether 
the worker is overeducated or not. Because of frictions and job competition, a vacancy 
may be filled by a worker with the demanded skill level or by an overeducated worker. In 
the former case, the value of a job is given by :  
  Jj,t = ρj,t yj - (1 + τ) wj,t + (1 - χk) Et [ Jj,t+1 /(1 + rt+1) ],  (5) 
where ρj,t is the competitive output price, τ is the payroll tax, wj,t is the gross wage and rt 
is the rate of interest. Similarly with an overeducated worker, we have:  
  J ̃j,t = ρj,t yj - (1 + τ) w̃j,t + (1 - χk – soi,t pj,t) Et [J̃j,t+1 / (1 + r t+1) ], (6)  
where w̃j,t is the gross wage paid to an overeducated worker (ie, with skill level i=j+1). 
The two wage rates can differ (see below, section on wage bargaining). Both equations 
(5) and (6) take implicitly into account the free entry condition, which makes the value of 
a vacant job equal to zero. The value of a vacancy is defined as follows: 
  Λj,t = - aj + Et {[ωj,t qj,t Jj,t+1 + (1–ωj,t) qj,t J ̃j,t+1 + (1–qj,t) Λj,t+1]/ (1 + rt+1)},   j ∈ {1,2,3} (7) 
where aj is a per-period recruitment cost,  qj,t the probability to meet a worker, and ωj,t the 
probability that the latter has the demanded skill level. With no job competition, ωj,t is 
equal to one, which makes (6) irrelevant and considerably simplifies (7). Firms post 
vacancies until all profit opportunities are exploited, i.e. the value of a vacancy is zero: 
  Λj,t = 0 ,   j ∈ {1,2,3} . (8) 
2.3 Representative final good firm  
The final goods market is perfectly competitive. The production function is represented 
by Yt = F(Kt , Qt) where Kt stands for capital and Qt = (Q1,t, Q2t, Q3,t) is the vector of 
intermediate inputs. The production function satisfies the usual concavity assumptions: 
F’> 0 and F”< 0. The representative final goods firm chooses the optimal levels of capital 
Kt and intermediate inputs Qj,t so as to maximize the value of the firm. With the final 
good as numeraire, the optimization program can be written as follows:  
  max Kt, Qj,t     Πt = F(Kt, Qt) - ∑j ρj,t Qj,t - (rt + δ) Kt + Et [Πt+1 / (1 + rt+1)], (9) 
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and Qj,t the quantity of intermediate goods j. 
Equilibrium on the intermediate goods market further imposes:  
  Qj,t = yj (Nj,t + Ñj+1,t)  (10)  
2.4 Households  
We distinguish three categories of households, corresponding each to a given skill group.  
The low-skill household (i=1) has only access to the low-skill segment of the labor 
market. We further assume that it has no access to capital markets, so that its 
consumption is always equal to its disposable income2. The skilled and high-skilled 
households (i=2, 3) have access to capital markets and own the firms; they also have 
                                                 
2 This assumption seems reasonable enough, if one keeps in mind that it corresponds to workers paid at the 
minimum wage.  
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access to two types of jobs, those corresponding to their own skill level (“normal” jobs) 
and those for which they are overeducated (“de-skilling” jobs). They choose in every 
period the amount of investment (Ii,t) and search effort (ei,t and eoi,t) that maximize their 
intertemporal welfare, measured by:  
  Wi,t = Γ(Ci,t) - D(Ni,t, Ñi,t)+ β Et [Wi,t+1], i ∈ {2, 3}  (11) 
where β is a subjective discount factor, Γ(.) is instantaneous consumption utility, D(.) is 
the disutility associated to the two types of jobs. The flow budget constraint is: 
  Ci,t =(1–τi) wi,t Ni,t + (1–τi-1) w̃i-1,t Ñi,t + bi,t Ui,t + (rt + δ) Ki,t +  πi,t – Ii,t – Ti,t  (12)  
where τi and τi-1 are the rates of personal taxation on wage incomes for both types of jobs, 
bi,t is the unemployment benefit, Ti,t is a lump sum government tax. The household 
receives a share πi of intermediate firms’ profits. Investment Ii,t determines the future 
value of the capital stock: 
  Ii,t = Ki,t+1 - (1 - δ)Ki,t  .  (13)  
The aggregate capital stock is given by  
  Kt = ∑i Ki,t . (14) 
The household’s optimization program amounts to maximizing (11) in Ci,t, ei,t, eoi,t, 
subject to the budget constraint (12), the accumulation equation (13) and the labor flow 
equations (2), (3.b) and (4.b). 
2.5 Wage formation  
We assume continuous Nash bargaining3 in the two sectors with higher skill levels 
(j=2,3). The wage paid on a “normal” job in sector j is obtained from:  
  wj,t = argmax wj,t {WNj,t / ΓCj,t}
η {Jj,t}(1-η) . (15.a) 
where η is the bargaining power of a worker and WNj,t ≡ ∂Wj,t/∂Nj,t is the utility value of 
an additional “normal” job for a household of skill level i=j. The wage paid to an 
overeducated worker (with skill level i=j+1) is obtained in a similar way: 
  w̃j,t = argmax w̃j,t {WÑj+1,t / ΓCj+1,t}
η {Jj,t}(1-η) .  (15.b) 
The two wages can differ because the value of the job can be different both for the 
worker (due to different marginal utilities, for instance) and for the firm (due to different 
expected job durations). We assume that in the lowest skill segment of the labor market 
(j=1), low-skill workers are paid the minimum wage. In the recent decades, the ratio of 
the lowest to the highest wages has remained stable in Europe (OECD (1996)). We 
therefore assume that minimum wages are indexed on wages in the high-tech sector (j=3).  
2.6 Government  
In each period, government spending equals the revenues from labor and taxes:  
  Gt + ∑i bi,t Ui,t = ∑i  (τ +τi) wi,t Ni,t + ∑i=2,3 (τ + τi) w̃i-1,t Ñi,t + ∑i Ti,t,  (16)  
                                                 
3 Assuming continuous job bargaining without any possibility of commitment to future wages, our on-the-
job search model does not generate the non-convexity problem discussed in Shimer (2006), where the wage 
remains fixed until separation. 
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where Gt stands for public consumption. The unemployment benefit bi,t is  proportional to 
the average gross wage in skill group i.  
2.7 General equilibrium  
A dynamic general equilibrium is a sequence of prices {rt, ρjt, wjt, w̃jt}t=0 → ∞ and 
quantities {Yt, Kt, Qjt, Nit, Ñit}t=0 → ∞ such that each category of agents carries out its 
optimization program (respectively (8), (9), (11) and (15)), and market clearing 
conditions and budget constraints are satisfied (respectively (10), (14) and (16))).  
 
3 Quantitative Evaluations of Selective Reductions in Labor Taxes  
 
We use our model to obtain quantitative evaluations of different tax cut policies. We first 
calibrate the model and next use numerical simulations to evaluate the long run effects of 
four specific scenarios, both with and without job competition effects. 
 
3.1 Calibration  
 
We follow most of the literature by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production and matching 
functions. Instantaneous utilities are logarithmic in consumption and linear in 
employment levels. Search efficiencies are the linear functions of the square root of time 
devoted to search. We calibrate the model on the Belgian economy. Our calibration is 
consistent with the RBC literature and with earlier studies for France, as well as Belgium. 
The calibrated parameters fall into three categories: (i) standard values found in all 
models of this type; (ii) parameters specific to this particular model for which we have 
empirical information; (iii) parameters specific to this model for which we do not have 
direct information; their values are fixed so that the model reproduces the state of the 
economy similar to that of the mid-nineties with respect to a number of endogenous 
variables such as unemployment rate, probability to find a job, probability to fill a 
vacancy, wage ratios and alike. 
The low-skill group (i=1; primary school education) represents about 15% of the 
active population; the high-skill group (i=3; educational level: upper-secondary or more) 
about 65%. The reference unemployment rates for these two groups are 27% and 8% 
respectively. The models with and without job competition are calibrated so as to have 
the same baseline steady state, in order to assess reliably the effects induced by job 
competition and the so-called ladder effects. Next, we must specify the relationship 
between search time and efficiency. We represent search efficiency as a concave function 
of search time. The parameters are chosen to reproduce the percentage of overqualified 
workers close to that suggested by empirical studies (in the region of 10%; see for 
instance Hartog (2000)),  and a realistic fraction of time spent on search (around 80% on 
the optimal segment for unemployed workers; around 10% of available time for on-the-
job search). For details of calibration, see Batyra and Sneessens (2007).  
3.2 Comparing different tax cut scenarios  
The first scenario is a reduction in employer payroll taxes targeted at the minimum wage 
in sector j=1. The tax cut is financed by a lump sum tax on high-skilled workers (i=3) in 
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such a manner that the government budget remains balanced. For comparison with other 
studies, the magnitude of the tax cut is such that the ex ante cost of the subsidy represents 
1% of GDP. The other three scenarios are defined in a similar way, but the tax cut is 
targeted at different sectors. We discuss successively the models with perfect (no job 
competition/deskilling effects) and imperfect segmentation.  
Without job competition/de-skilling effects 
The long run effects are summarized in Table 1. With a tax cut targeted at minimum 
wages (scenario (a)), the total employment rise amounts to about 2% of the active 
population. This increase is strong enough to render the measure self-financing (less 
unemployment benefits, higher tax revenues). The employment effect is more than 
halved when sectors 1 and 2 are targeted simultaneously (scenario (b)); the cost per job 
created becomes (moderately) positive. This scenario is closest to the one examined in 
earlier studies4. Those studies obtain a larger increase in employment (about 1.13%, 
compared to 0.79% in our model), because they impose a stronger real wage rigidity: 
sectors 1 and 2 being pooled together, both wages w1,t and w2,t are assumed to be rigid 
and indexed on high-skill wages. These differences also imply a substantially larger cost 
per job created.  
Table 1: Effects of payroll tax cut (1% GDP) without job competition effects 
  The four scenarios 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 Sector(s) j=1 j=1 & 2 j=2 j=3 
      
Tax cut (%)  26.7 8.5 12.5 2.7 
      
Ex ante wage cost (% change) j=1 -20.0 -6.0   
 j=2  -6.0 -9.0  
 j=3    -2.0 
      
Ex post wage cost (% change) j=1 -18.8 -5.8 0.2 1.8 
 j=2 1.3 -0.3 -1.2 0.0 
 j=3 1.3 0.6 1.2 -0.2 
      
Employment change j=1 13.89 4.39  0.00 -1.24  
(in % of active population j=2 0.04  0.65  0.95 0.01  
in relevant group) j=3 0.03  0.01  0.01 0.10  
 Total 2.06  0.79  0.21 -0.12  
Cost per job created      
(’000 euro per year)  -1.86 14.9 112 - 
      
Production (% change)  1.36 0.58 0.17 -0.06 
Productivity (% change)  -1.03 -0.33 -0.06 0.08 
      
Welfare (% change) i=1 0.77 0.29 0.05 0.52 
 i=2 0.70 0.46 0.30 -0.11 
 i=3 1.37 0.63 0.08 -0.23 
 
                                                 
4 See for instance Pierrard and Sneessens (2008). 
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Policies targeted at relatively high wages (either sector j=2 or 3; scenario (c) and (d) 
respectively) have an employment effect that is weakly positive or even negative. This is 
because gross wages rise and absorb most of the benefits of the tax cut. The minimum 
wage, being indexed on high wages, rises as well so that the number of low-skill jobs 
decreases. In scenario (d), the tax cut reduces output. This is the consequence of strong 
congestion effects on the labor market, leading to substantially higher recruiting 
expenses. In all scenarios except the last one, welfare increases for all groups.  
To summarize, we find, mutatis mutandis, the same result as in a general 
equilibrium model with endogenous job destruction and minimum wages5: narrow policy 
targeting at bottom wages (the 10% of workers paid the minimum wage) stimulates 
employment and the tax cut is self-financing. Still, without the job-destruction channel, 
the employment effect is three times weaker.  
 
With job competition/de-skilling effects 
 
Simulation details for a scenario with job competition and on-the-job search are displayed 
in Table 2. As in the case without job competition, targeting the tax cut on bottom wages 
increases employment by about 2%. This similarity in numbers is however misleading: 
because of de-skilling effects, a non-negligible fraction of the newly created jobs is taken 
up by overeducated workers (see column (a)), so that the impact on low-skill 
unemployment is reduced.   
The policy is no longer self-financing. Although its cost remains low (about 2 000 euro 
per year per job created; less than 0.2% of GDP), the welfare of type 2 and 3 workers is 
reduced. Introducing the job destruction channel would of course improve the beneficial 
employment effects, possibly rendering the measure self-financing. As earlier, a broader 
targeting (scenario (b)) considerably reduces the number of jobs created. Still, the cost 
per job created remains reasonable. A reduction targeted at the high skill level (scenario 
(d)) reduces job competition and de-skilling effects, so that total employment (slightly) 
increases, but the cost per new job is exorbitant. All workers endure welfare losses!   
The comparison between Tables 1 and 2 suggest that, in the face of job 
competition, a scenario combining substantial tax rebates for minimum wage workers 
with much smaller but positive rebates for intermediate wages (and zero rebates for high 
wages) would avoid part of the induced de-skilling effects and reduce inefficiencies. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See Pierrard (2005) for Belgium. 
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Table 2: Effects of payroll tax cut (1% GDP) with job competition effects 
 
   The four scenarios 
   (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 Sector(s)  j=1 j=1 & 2 j=2 j=3 
       
Tax cut (%)   26.7 8.5 12.5 2.7 
       
Ex ante wage cost (% change) j=1  -20.0 -6.0   
 j=2   -6.0 -9.0  
 j=3     -2.0 
       
Ex post wage cost (% change) j=1 1 -19.0 -5.3 1.1 1.6 
  2 -19.0 -5.4 1.1 1.6 
 j=2 2 2.8 -3.2 -4 1.2 
  3 2.6 -3.5 -6.2 -1.5 
 j=3 3 1.2 1.1 1.1 -0.4 
       
Employment change j=1 1 10.87 5.57  3.17  -0.31  
(in % of active population  2 3.91  -0.97  -2.81  -0.51  
in relevant group) j=2 2 -2.42 1.42  2.93  0.63  
  3 0.29  0.59  0.80  -0.49  
 j=3 3 -0.16 -0.42  -0.59  0.55  
 Total  1.99  1.02  0.62  0.01  
Cost per job created       
 (’000 euro per year)   2.0 9.3 25.1 1 377.6 
       
Overqualified workers (% change) j=1  4.0 -2.1 -4.9 -0.8 
 j=2  1.3 1.7 2.1 -1.7 
 Total  2.5 0.2 -0.6 -1.3 
       
Production (% change)   0.99 0.64 0.4 0.21 
Productivity (% change)   -1.31 -0.74 -0.32 0.19 
       
Welfare (% change) i=1  0.84 0.59 -0.47 -0.45 
 i=2  -0.72 -0.71 -0.93 -0.94 
 i=3  -1.65 -1.63 -2.02 -2.17 
 
 3.3 Comparing different sizes of tax cuts targeted at minimum wages 
The previous tables make clear that tax cuts targeted on minimum wages are the most 
effective ones. So far we discussed the effects of tax cuts costing ex ante 1% of GDP. We 
now examine the effects of changes in the size of tax cuts targeted on minimum wages. 
The focus is on the effects on the welfare of each category of workers.  
Without job competition, the policy is (almost) always self-financing; all workers 
enjoy larger welfare (see left panel of Figure 1). With job competition and de-skilling 
effects (right panel of the figure), tax cuts below 12% remain self-financing. These 
financial gains generate positive lump sum transfers to high-skill (i=3) workers and are 
initially large enough to make them better off. This is not true for the intermediate skill 
group (i=2), which by assumption does not benefit from these transfers and suffers 
directly from the negative externalities associated with job competition behaviors induced 
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by blind individual utility maximization. For tax cuts above 7%, both categories 2 and 3 
face progressively larger and larger welfare losses. Our results emphasize that, although 
tax cuts targeted at the minimum wage level may be effective in creating jobs at 
reasonable total cost, they also generate substantial redistribution effects which, in the 
case of job competition, may harm a vast majority of workers. 
 
Figure 1: Welfare changes (%) for each category of workers as a function of the size of 
the tax cut targeted at the minimum wage, with (right) and without (left) job competition.  











































4 Conclusions and policy implications  
To assess the effects of structural payroll tax cuts targeted on specific skill groups, we use 
a stylized inter-temporal general equilibrium with search and matching on the labor 
markets. This model is able to shed light on the results obtained in previous quantitative 
analyses. Compared to earlier studies, we use a model with a finer definition of skill 
groups. We find that targeting payroll tax cuts at minimum wages is crucial. In such a 
scenario, there is substantial job creation affecting the low-skill workers because their 
wages are very sensitive to tax cuts and recruitment costs are low. Furthermore, through 
capital accumulation and the labor productivity channel, there are positive job creation 
spill-overs across skill groups. Absent job competition and de-skilling effects, tax cuts 
targeted at the minimum wage would be largely self-financing and benefit all categories 
of workers. We show however that introducing job competition and de-skilling (or 
“ladder”) modifies substantially the results. Although job creation remains large and the 
total cost of extra jobs remains quite reasonable in % of GDP, the negative externalities 
associated with job competition may quickly become large (even with realistic values of 
the percentage of overqualified workers) and translate into negative welfare effects for 
the majority of workers. This result points out to the potential importance of political 
economy aspects and the need to design tax cut scenarios apt to limit job competition (by 
combining for instance substantial tax rebates for minimum wage workers with much 
smaller but positive rebates for intermediate wages, and zero rebates for high wages).  
In the context of the current global downturn, both European and USA economies 
have faced a sharp rise in unemployment rates (IMF (2009)), from 5.6% in 2007 to 9% in 
2009, and going up. Our analysis has focused on structural unemployment and relative 
wage rigidities, as opposed to cyclical unemployment fluctuations. However, our work 
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can shed light on some key issues related to cyclical phenomena and ensuing job 
competition whose negative effect shows in our quantitative study. By definition, a 
cyclical downturn is global and hits all sectors and skills levels simultaneously, even 
though job separations may be larger for low-skilled workers (e.g. because the cost of 
both separation and later re-hiring may be substantially lower for the low-skilled as they 
benefit from lower firing compensations and can be more easily substituted for one 
another). Furthermore, ceteris paribus, a global downturn exacerbates job competition 
and de-skilling effects, since skilled workers who lost their jobs have an incentive to also 
search for jobs below (but not too far) from their skill level, which further increases the 
unemployment rate of the low-skilled. Employment Outlook (OECD 2009) reports that 
the low-skilled were indeed particularly hit during this crisis, the sensitivity of low skilled 
employment to negative shocks being much higher than that of high skilled employment, 
and that a degree of crowding-out between skill groups has taken place and is expected to 
intensify when the number of unemployed increases. 
Reacting to a purely cyclical phenomenon by payroll tax cuts targeted on the low-
skilled may be in this context an inappropriate policy reaction, as it would further 
exacerbate such job competition. On the other hand, measures aiming at reducing 
"cyclical" job destruction should be welcome. This could be done, for instance, via 
temporary subsidies meant to sustain contractual relationships. Such measures have been 
used in several countries (e.g. short-time subsidies introduced in Ireland, Mexico, New 
Zealand, and extended in France, Germany, Belgium, Korea; or reductions in non-wage 
labor costs for all workers in Germany, Japan and Mexico). Moreover, maintaining and 
expanding eligibility for unemployment benefits for longer unemployment spells (as done 
in numerous countries) may help reduce wasteful job competition and de-skilling effects, 
by giving the unemployed a possibility to continue searching on their "home" market 
rather than taking de-skilling jobs because of financial constraints.  
 Our analysis also stresses the political economy aspects of selective tax cuts. 
Because of their redistributive implications, especially in the face of job competition, 
selective tax cuts may be hard to implement in normal times. The current unemployment 
hike may be the ideal time to do so.6 Such a policy may also help avoid that a part of the 
current unemployment hike becomes structural via a negative effect of skill loss or 
stigma on the long-term unemployed.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Edlin and Phelps (2009) implicitly rely on this argument when pleading for low-wage employer tax 
credits to stimulate the US economy: “the best kind of stimulus spending is spending that should have been 
done even if the economy were not in such peril.”  
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